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Abstract: The increasing amount and complexity of cyber security attacks in recent years have made text analysis and
data-mining based techniques an important factor in detecting security threats. However, despite the popular-
ity of text and other data mining techniques, the cyber security community has remained somehow reluctant in
adopting an open approach to security-related data. In this paper, we analyze a dataset that has been collected
from five Small and Medium companies in South Korea, this dataset represents cyber security incidents and
response actions. We investigate how the data representing different incidents collected from multiple compa-
nies can help improve the classification accuracy and help the classifiers in distinguishing between different
types of incidents. A model has been developed using text mining methods, such as n-gram, bag-of-words
and machine learning algorithms for the classification of incidents and their response actions. Experimental
results have demonstrated good performance of the classifiers for the prediction of different types of response
and malware.
1 INTRODUCTION
The use of text analysis and data mining in detecting
vulnerabilities and Cyber security threats is an activ-
ity that has been going on for a number of years now.
The increasing amount and complexity of Cyber secu-
rity attacks in recent years have brought data mining
techniques into the attention of researchers and ex-
perts as an important technique in detecting such at-
tacks through the analysis of data and the side-effects
left by malware and spyware programs and the inci-
dents of network and host intrusions.
Text analysis and mining is widely used in many
Cyber security areas, such as malware detection and
classification (Suh-Lee et al., 2016; Kakavand et al.,
2015; Norouzi et al., 2016; Fan et al., 2015; Hellal
and Romdhane, 2016; Lu et al., 2010; Fan et al., 2016;
Rieck et al., 2011; Ding et al., 2013) and malicious
code detection (Bahraminikoo et al., 2012; Schultz
et al., 2001; Shabtai et al., 2012).
In addition, the popularity of social media has
opened up the doors for text mining and analysis
as important techniques for increasing the knowl-
edge about users’ context, e.g. their location and
time, and combining that knowledge with other at-
tributes related to important events, topics, emotions
and interests (Inkpen, 2016). Other applications for
such techniques have included predicting links (Bartal
et al., 2009) and detecting leaks of confidential data
(Ojoawo et al., 2014), for example, private health in-
formation that users may inadvertently share on social
media (Ghazinour et al., 2013). Moreover, text clus-
tering and analysis has also been used extensively in
digital forensics, e.g. as in (Decherchi et al., 2009)
where text clustering was applied to the Enron cor-
pus (Klimt and Yang, 2004), or in (Xylogiannopou-
los et al., 2017), where text mining algorithms were
applied to unclean, noisy or scrambled datasets that
can be obtained from electronic communications such
as SMS communications, or in (Hicks et al., 2016)
where text mining was used for performing Web text
analysis and forensics.
The Cyber security community has remained
somehow reluctant in adopting an open approach to
security-related data despite all the popularity of text
and other data mining techniques, due to many fac-
tors such as political factors, for example, the fear
of many organizations to share their data since these
data could reveal sensitive information. Others factors
are more technical, such as the metrics that should be
used to quantify the security data themselves (Hoo,
2000) and he consistency, quality and the lack of con-
sensus on the nature of variables that should be mon-
itored. Furthermore, There is also the factor that re-
lated to whether past data are relevant to future events
(Parker, 1998). However, with the availability of
large and open security datasets and data-sharing plat-
forms backed by the reliability and reputation of well-
established organisations in the area of Cyber secu-
rity, e.g. VCDB (VERIZON, ), CERT’s Knowledge
base at Carnegie Mellon University (CERT Coordi-
nation Center, ), SecRepo (Mike Sconzo, ), CAIDA
(Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis, ) and oth-
ers, we are starting to witness an increasing trend in
the usage of such datasets in gaining insight into how
incidents occur.
In this paper, we analyse a dataset that has been
collected from five Small and Medium Enterprises
(SMEs), which represents textual data describing Cy-
ber security incidents that occurred in those com-
panies and the response actions that were applied.
In addition, we investigate how the data represent-
ing different incidents collected from multiple com-
panies can help improve the classification accuracy
and help the classifiers in distinguishing between dif-
ferent types of incidents. This is achieved by focusing
on two sets of questions: the first includes forward-
looking predictive questions, such as the prediction
of future responses from the type of malware or the
name of the malicious code encountered in previous
incidents, and the second includes backward-looking
questions that reverse-engineer the type of the mal-
ware or the name of the malicious code from past re-
sponses to incidents. The main objective of our anal-
ysis is to demonstrate how a centralised hub may col-
lect experience from multiple organisations in order
to train a single classifier that can predict features of
future Cyber security incidents.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2, highlights other works in the literature related
to the work presented in this paper. Section 3, out-
lines the research problem and our approach in solv-
ing it. The experimental setup and results in apply-
ing the classification problem to the Cyber security
incidents dataset are presented in section 4. Finally,
Section 5, concludes the paper and outlines some di-
rections for future research.
2 Related Work
In this section we review related works for de-
tecting and classifying malware and malicious code
using text analysis and data mining methods. Data
mining techniques have many applications related to
malware detection. In (Suh-Lee et al., 2016) authors
detect security threats using data mining, text clas-
sification, natural language processing, and machine
learning by extracting relevant information from var-
ious unstructured log messages. Authors in (Kaka-
vand et al., 2015) proposed an anomaly detector
model called Text Mining-Based Anomaly Detection
(TMAD) model to detect HTTP attacks in network
traffic. The proposed model uses n-gram text cate-
gorization and (Term Frequency, Inverse Document
Frequency) TF-IDF methods.
Different classification methods have been pro-
posed by (Norouzi et al., 2016) in order to detect
malware programs based on the feature and behav-
ior of each malware program. In addition, authors in
(Fan et al., 2015), utilised hooking techniques to trace
the dynamic signatures that malware programs try to
hide, for the classification process, machine learning
algorithms were used such as Naı¨ve Bayesian, J48
(Decision Tree), and Support Vector Machine.
In (Hellal and Romdhane, 2016) authors proposed
an approach that combines static analysis and graph-
mining techniques. In addition, a novel algorithm
was proposed, called Minimal Contrast Frequent Sub-
graph Miner (MCFSM) algorithm, which is used for
extracting minimal discriminative and widely em-
ployed malicious behavioral patterns. Furthermore,
authors in (Lu et al., 2010) proposed a new ensemble
learning model, SVM-AR. The proposed model com-
bined features extracted from both content-based and
behavior-based analysis to represent instances. While
in (Rieck et al., 2011) a framework was proposed for
the automatic analysis of malware behavior using ma-
chine learning. The framework allows for automati-
cally identifying novel classes of malware with simi-
lar behavior (clustering) and assigning unknown mal-
ware to these discovered classes (classification).
In (Ding et al., 2013), an Application Pro-
gramming Interface (API)-based association mining
method was proposed for detecting malware. A clas-
sification method based on multiple association rules
was adopted. Furthermore, data mining-based ma-
licious code detectors have been proven to be suc-
cessful in detecting clearly malicious code, e.g. like
viruses and worms. In (Bahraminikoo et al., 2012)
a method was proposed for spyware detection using
data mining techniques. The framework focused on
DM-based malicious code detectors using Breadth-
First Search (BFS) approach, which are known to
work well for detecting viruses and similar software.
In (Schultz et al., 2001) authors proposed a data-
mining framework that detects new, previously un-
seen malicious executable accurately and automat-
ically. The data-mining framework automatically
found patterns in the data set and used these patterns
to detect a set of new malicious binaries. A Machine
learning algorithms were used such as RIPPER, Naı¨ve
Bayes and Multi-Naı¨ve Bayes. The authors in (Fan
et al., 2016) proposed a sequence mining algorithm
to discover malicious sequential patterns, based on
the instruction sequences extracted from the file sam-
ple set, and then a Nearest-Neighbor (ANN) classi-
fier was constructed for malware detection based on
the discovered patterns. The developed data mining
framework composed of the proposed sequential pat-
tern mining method and ANN classifier.
Furthermore, authors in (Wang et al., 2006) pro-
posed an integrated architecture to defend against
surveillance spyware and used features extracted from
both static and dynamic analysis. These features were
ranked according to their information gains. In ad-
dition, a machine learning algorithm was used. In
(Abou-Assaleh et al., 2004), the authors presented a
method based on byte n-gram analysis to detect mali-
cious code using Common N-Gram analysis (CNG),
which relies on profiles for class representation. The
authors in (Shabtai et al., 2012) presented the in-
spected files using OpCode n-gram patterns, which
are extracted from the files after disassembly for de-
tecting unknown malicious code. The OpCode n-
gram patterns are used as features for the classifica-
tion process.
Other works used machine learning techniques for
the detection classification of malicious code. In (Hou
et al., 2010) authors proposed a malicious web page
detection using of machine learning techniques by an-
alyzing the characteristic of a malicious Web page. In
addition, authors in (Zhang et al., 2007) proposed a
method to automatically detecting malicious code us-
ing the n-gram analysis. The proposed method used
selected features based on information gain. Finally,
in (Elovici et al., 2007) authors proposed an approach
for detecting malicious code using machine learning
techniques. Three machine learning algorithms were
used which are Decision trees, Neural Networks and
Bayesian Networks in order to determine whether a
suspicious executable file actually inhabits malicious
code.
3 The Proposed Approach
The main scenario motivating our work is one in
which a centralized hub, shown in Figure 1, collects
data generated by multiple companies (organisations)
and therefore maintains a centralized dataset repre-
senting the collective experience of those companies.
The datasets collected from these companies are used
to train one centralized classifier, which would then
have better performance than any individual instance
belonging to a single company.
Figure 1: Experience collection from n number of compa-
nies
3.1 Description of the Dataset
The dataset represents Cyber security intrusion
events in five Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
over a period of ten months, which were collected by
the KAITS Industrial Technology Security Hub 1 in
South Korea. The Hub is a public-private partnership
supported by governmental agencies in order to sup-
port the sharing of knowledge, experience and exper-
tise across SMEs.
The data for each SME are stored in a separate file.
There are 4643 entries overall. Each entry, expressed
as a row, has the following metadata:
• Date and Time of Occurrence: this is a value
representing the date and time of the incident’s oc-
currence.
• End Device: this is a value representing the name
of the end device affected in the incident.
• Malicious Code: this is a value representing the
name of the malicious code detected in the inci-
dent.
• Response: this is a value representing the re-
sponse action that was applied to the malicious
code.
1http://www.kaits.or.kr/index.do
• Type of Malware: this is a value representing
the type of the malware (malicious code) detected
in the incident.
• Detail: this is a free text value to describe any
other detail about the incident.
An example entry from this dataset is shown
below:
(14/02/2017 11:58, rc0208-pc,
Gen:Variant.Mikey.57034, deleted, virus,
C:\Users\RC0208\AppData\Local\Temp\is-ANFS3.
tmp\SetupG.exe)
3.2 Research Problems
Our research in this paper is aimed at investigating
two kinds of problems, which we take a classification
approach to solving them:
• The first problem is forward-looking to attempt to
predict future aspects of Cyber security incidents.
More specifically, how an organization can gain
the ability to predict response actions to future
Cyber security incidents involving malware. We
consider two questions here: a) how to predict a
response action from the name of malicious code,
and b) how to predict a response action from the
type of malware involved in the incident.
• The second problem is backward-looking to in-
vestigate, for example, as part of a digital foren-
sics process, properties of current incidents. More
specifically, how an organization can utilize its
knowledge of the response actions in guiding digi-
tal forensics analysis to determine the type of mal-
ware or the name of the malicious code to inves-
tigate. We consider here two questions: c) how to
identify the type of the malware based on the name
of malicious code, and d) how to identify the type
of the malware based on the response action.
3.3 Data Anaylsis and Classification
Model
In this section, we describe the processes that have
been taken for the analysis and classification of the
dataset. A model has been developed using knime
software 2, which makes use of the most used features
in text mining such as n-gram, Bag-of-Words, Snow-
ball Stemmer and stop words remover. This model
consists of three main parts (1) Data analysis and Pre-
processing, (2) Features Extraction and (3) Classifica-
tion. The phases of the model are described below:
2https://www.knime.com/
Phase 1: Data Analysis and Pre-processing
The main objective of pre-processing is to clean
the data from noise in which this will help to improve
the accuracy of the results by reducing the errors in
the data. This is done by removing special charac-
ters and stop words such as ”a” and ”the”, punctua-
tion marks such as question and exclamation marks,
and numbers. In addition, all terms are converted to
lowercase. The resulting terms are used to generate
the n-gram features.
Phase 2: Features Extraction: Feature extrac-
tion help in the analysis and classification and also
in improving accuracy. The most commonly used
features in text mining are n-gram and bag-of-words.
The model makes use of ”bigram” which is an n-gram
for n = 2, every two adjacent words create a bigram
e.g. ”malware detection”. In this phase, a bag-of-
words is created containing all words (bigram). This
bag-of-words is filtered based on the minimum fre-
quency in which terms that occur in less than the min-
imum frequency are filtered out and not used as fea-
tures using term frequency (TF) method.
Phase 3: Classification: The classification phase
is executed using machine learning algorithms such
as Naı¨ve Bayes (NB) and Support Vector Machine
(SVM). In this phase, the n-gram features predictive
models are built, tested and compared. The dataset
is split into training and test set. The training dataset
is used for building the model, and the test dataset is
used to evaluate the performance of the model.
4 Experimental Study and Results
The objective of the experimental study is to ex-
plore the ability of machine learning classifiers to dis-
tinguish between (1) the different types of response
based on the given malicious code, (2) the different
types of response based on the given malware, (3) the
different types of malware according to the malicious
code and (4) the different types of malware based on
the different responses. Two machine learning algo-
rithms were used for the classification process, which
are Naı¨ve Bayes (NB) and Support Vector Machine
(SVM).
We have used the dataset that was selected from
five different companies provided by the KAITS In-
dustrial Technology Security Hub in South Korea.
The distribution of the data is given in Table 1. As
mentioned in Section 3, all the incidents of the five
companies were collected by a centralised hub and the
concatenated data were used for the experiment with
the objective of evaluating the performance of the
classifiers in distinguishing between different types
of incidents and investigating how different data col-
lected from multiple companies can help in improving
the classification accuracy.
Table 1: Data distribution
Company Name Total Number of Incidents
Company 1(DF) 932
Company 2(MT) 633
Company 3(SE) 923
Company 4(EP) 448
Company 5(MS) 1707
Total 4643
4.1 Performance Evaluation Metrics
To assess the performance of the machine learning
classifiers performance indicators, such as accuracy,
precision, recall, and F-measure (Chinchor, 1992), are
calculated as shown in the following formulæ.
Accuracy =
# of correct predictions (TP+TN)
# of predictions (TP+TN+FP+FN)
Precision =
T P
T P+FP
Recall =
T P
T P+FN
F = 2× Precision×Recall
Precision+Recall
• True Positive (TP): An instance that is positive
and is classified correctly as positive.
• True Negative (TN): An instance that is negative
and is classified correctly as negative.
• False Positive (FP): An instance that is negative
but is classified wrongly as positive.
• False Negative (FN): An instance that is positive
but is classified wrongly as negative.
4.2 Results
In this section, we present and analyse the results
of the machine learning algorithms for the four differ-
ent problems that were proposed.
4.2.1 Problem 1: Identifying the different types
of response based on the given malicious
code
Table 2 presents the classification performance de-
tails of the SVM and Naı¨ve Bayes classifiers in iden-
tifying the different types of response based on the
given malicious code. SVM has achieved an ac-
curacy of 81% while NB achieved an accuracy of
73%. Comparing the performance of both classi-
fiers, Both SVM and NB had a zero precision, re-
call and f-measure for response types ”Recovered”
and ”Name Changed”. While both classifiers had a
100% precision, recall, and f-measure for response
type ”Blocked”. For the rest of the types of response,
NB could identify response type ”None” and achieved
a recall of 50% while SVM had a zero precision, re-
call, and f-measure for this type. In addition, for the
response type ”Segregated” and ”Deleted” SVM has
the highest recall and f-measure while NB has the
highest precision. Furthermore, for the response type
”Not defined” SVM has the highest precision while
NB has the highest recall and f-measure.
Table 2: Performance of the classifiers in identifying the
different types of response based on the malicious code.
SV M NB
Accuracy: 81% 73%
Class: P R F P R F
None 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.50 0.18
Recovered 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Segregated 0.90 0.72 0.80 0.91 0.55 0.68
Deleted 0.61 0.92 0.73 0.64 0.80 0.71
Not defined 1.00 0.84 0.91 0.79 0.89 0.84
Blocked 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Name Changed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4.2.2 Problem 2: Identifying the different types
of response based on the given malware
Table 3 presents the classification performance de-
tails of the SVM and Naı¨ve Bayes classifiers in iden-
tifying the different types of response based on the
given malware. SVM and NB achieved an accuracy
of 73% and 72.8% respectively. Comparing the per-
formance of both classifiers, both classifiers failed to
identify the response type ”None, ”Recovered” and
”Name Changed”. In addition, both classifiers had
similar precision, recall, and f-measure for response
type ”Segregated and ”Blocked” and nearly similar
precision, recall and f-measure for response types
”Not defined” and Deleted”.
4.2.3 Problem 3: Identifying the different types
of malware according to the malicious code
Table 4 presents the classification performance de-
tails of the SVM and Naı¨ve Bayes classifiers in iden-
tifying the different types of malware according to
the malicious code. SVM achieved an accuracy of
77% while NB achieved an accuracy of 70%. Both
Table 3: Performance of the classifiers in identifying the
different types of response based on malware.
SV M NB
Accuracy: 73% 72.8%
Class: P R F P R F
None 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Recovered 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Segregated 0.83 0.13 0.23 0.83 0.13 0.23
Deleted 0.97 0.88 0.92 0.97 0.87 0.92
Not defined 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99
Blocked 0.43 1.00 0.60 0.43 1.00 0.60
Name Changed 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
classifiers could not identify malware type ”Web con-
tents” and NB achieved very low precision, recall,
and f-measure for malware type ”Downloaded file”,
while SVM failed to identify this type. In addition,
SVM has the highest recall of 100% for malware type
”Email attachment”, while NB has the highest pre-
cision and f-measure. Furthermore, SVM achieved
the highest precision and f-measure for malware type
”Spyware”, while NB has the highest recall. For the
malware type ”Virus”, SVM has the highest recall and
f-measure while NB has the highest precision.
Table 4: Performance of the classifiers in identifying the
different types of malware according to the malicious code
SV M NB
Accuracy: 77% 70%
Class: P R F P R F
Email attachment 0.53 1.00 0.69 0.57 0.89 0.70
Spyware 1.00 0.86 0.92 0.79 0.89 0.84
Virus 0.90 0.75 0.82 0.98 0.54 0.69
Downloaded file 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.39 0.30
Web Contents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4.2.4 Problem 4: Identifying the different types
of malware based on the different
responses
Table 5 presents the classification performance de-
tails of the SVM and Naı¨ve Bayes classifiers in iden-
tifying the different types of malware based on the
different responses. SVM and NB achieved similar
accuracy of 92%. In addition, SVM and NB failed to
identify malware types ”Downloaded file” and ”Web
contents”, while both classifiers had similar precision,
recall, and f-measure for malware types ”Email at-
tachment, ”Spyware” and ”Virus”.
4.3 Discussion
In this research, many factors have affected the
identification and classification process using ma-
chine learning. We will discuss the overall results be-
low.
Table 5: Performance of the classifiers in identifying the
different types of malware based on the different responses
SV M NB
Accuracy: 92% 92%
Class: P R F P R F
Email attachment 0.99 0.88 0.93 0.99 0.88 0.93
Spyware 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Virus 0.93 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.89 0.91
Downloaded file 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Web Contents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
The overall results for the identification of the dif-
ferent types of responses based on the given malicious
code indicated that SVM was the best classifier, but
NB performed better due to the fact that it could iden-
tify five different type of the responses while SVM
only identify four types. While, the overall results
for the identification of the different types of response
based on the given malware showed that SVM and
NB had nearly similar accuracy and precision, re-
call, and f-measure for most response types in which
SVM and NB could identify four different types of
the response. The poor performance from the classi-
fiers was due to the fact that some types of malware
were assigned by the companies to multiple response
types (e.g segregated and name changed are assigned
to malware type virus) and the high and low frequency
of some types affected the classification this because
of the imbalance of the categories.
Furthermore, the overall results for the identifica-
tion of the different types of malware according to the
malicious code indicated that SVM was the best clas-
sifier but NB performed better due to the fact that it
could identify five different type of the malware while
SVM only identify three types. While, the overall
results or the identification of the different types of
malware based on the different responses showed that
SVM and NB performed well and had similar preci-
sion, recall, and f-measure for most response types
in which SVM and NB could identify three different
type of malware only.
Following from the discussion above, we observe
the following about the overall results:
(1) The classification accuracy was affected by the
imbalance of the (dataset) categories and the
inconsistency of the categories that were used
across the five companies (e.g type of responses
and malware types) as shown in Tables 6 and 7.
This problem could not be handled due to the fact
that we are trying to solve real case problems and
applying an algorithm to handle class imbalance
will result in altering the given information.
(2) The classifiers performance was affected by the
multi-labeling of some of the categories.
Table 6: Type of responses distribution for five companies shows the imbalance of the data which affect the classification
performance of the classifiers
Type of Responses Co1 (DF) Co2 (MT) Co3 (SE) Co4 (EP) Co5 (MS) Total
Blocked 166 89 411 231 5 902
Deleted 39 98 172 91 1153 1553
Name Changed 2 2 10 4 2 20
None 65 3 43 9 4 124
Segregated 153 288 206 61 201 909
Not defined 0 153 81 28 326 588
Recovered 42 0 0 24 10 76
Table 7: Type of malware distribution for five companies shows the imbalance of the data which affect the classification
performance of the classifiers
Type of Malware Co1 (DF) Co2 (MT) Co3 (SE) Co4 (EP) Co5 (MS) Total
Email attachment 372 0 117 99 1140 1728
Spyware 93 153 81 27 326 680
Virus 467 480 725 322 87 2081
Downloaded file 0 0 0 0 149 149
Web Contents 0 0 0 0 5 5
(3) Malware types could actually be used for the iden-
tification of malicious code even-though from a
security point of view there is no explicit research
showing that this is possible.
(4) Problem 2 was the most difficult problem to pre-
dict in which the classifiers’ performance was the
lowest in this case.
(5) SVM is more suitable for the detection of types of
response using the malicious code, the detection
of types of response using malware. In addition to
the detection of malware based on the malicious
code. While SVM and NB could be used for the
detection of the types of malware using the differ-
ent types of response as their performance results
are similar.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, a dataset collected from five SMEs
in South Korea was analysed to demonstrate how a
centralised hub may collect experience from multi-
ple organisations in order to train a single classifier
that can predict features of future Cyber security in-
cidents. Moreover, a model has been developed us-
ing text mining methods. Using machine learning al-
gorithms for the classification of these incidents and
their response actions, experimental results showed
good performance of the classifiers in predicting dif-
ferent types of response and malware.
As future work, we are planning to test other Cy-
ber security datasets and evaluate the performance of
different machine learning algorithms. In addition,
we aim to investigate how handling class imbalance
can help to improve the classification accuracy.
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